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SUMMARY: Using a CGE model for the Balearic Islands, we simulate the effects of an agricultural wa-
ter market in the farming sector facing reductions in the water endowment. The market lessens the nega-
tive effects on farming communities of short-term water restrictions associated with cyclical droughts.
However, in scenarios of permanent reductions, such as those envisaged by global warming predictions or
those that result from the implementation of the European Water Framework Directive, a water market
may aggravate the negative effects of water shortage. Therefore, the paper shows that generalizations can-
not be made about the effects of water markets on farming communities.
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Efectos económicos regionales de las transferencias de agua: el papel de la 
mobilidad de los factores en el caso del sector agrícola de Baleares
RESUMEN: Mediante un modelo CGE para Baleares simulamos los efectos de un mercado de agua en la
agricultura ante escenarios de reducción en la dotación de agua. Los resultados muestran como dicho mer-
cado ayudaría a mitigar los efectos negativos que producen las sequías cíclicas sobre las comunidades agríco-
las, mientras que podría agravar los efectos negativos de una reducción permanente en la disponibilidad del
agua causada, por ejemplo, por el cambio climático o la aplicación de la Directiva Marco del Agua. Ello pone
de manifiesto que no es posible realizar generalizaciones acerca de los efectos regionales de un mercado de
agua.
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1.  Introduction
Due to the growing interest in finding a balance between the environmental qual-
ity of water systems and the need to cover human needs, managing the demand for
water has taken a prevalent position  within water policies recommended or mandated
by leading international bodies (the OECD, International Water Supply Association,
European Union and World Bank). Basically, emphasis is being placed on the conser-
vation, recycling and more efficient use and allocation of water. The idea is to man-
age the demand for all uses in a more efficient way in order to encourage water
savings so that “new” supplies are made available and water can be more efficiently
allocated to different uses and users.
In the specific case of the European Union, the Water Framework Directive
(2000) points to the need to introduce water conservation policies, reducing the pres-
sure of economic activities in order to improve the condition of our water-based
ecosystems. To accomplish this, it recommends the use of economic instruments and
the implementation of water pricing policies that recover all the costs of the water
service. 
In Spain, a few initiatives have been made to apply the Water Framework Direc-
tive (WFD) through a series of Activities for the Management and Use of Water
(A.G.U.A in Spanish)1, designed to guarantee the availability and quality of water
throughout the whole country. Among the specific initiatives that it contemplates, it is
worth highlighting the creation of Water Banks in all river basins so that water rights
can be reallocated based on the criteria of equity, efficiency and sustainability. The
aim is to reduce water deficits in certain river basins and to ensure a good water status
for Spanish surface waters and ground waters. 
Within the current guidelines of hydrological policies, emphasis has been placed
on the benefits of allocative efficiency through institutional changes that permit the
introduction of water transactions. Nonetheless, arguments have also been put for-
ward against the introduction of water markets, many highlighting the possible nega-
tive effects for farming communities [Howitt (1994), Schmidt and Plaut (1995)].
These arguments state that the introduction of water markets would lead to a reduc-
tion in these communities’ agricultural output since it would encourage farmers to
sell their water allowance, with big impacts on third parties engaged in other rural ac-
tivities. These sales could affect sectors like livestock farming, agricultural inputs in-
dustries, and the processing of agricultural products, leading to a reduction in the tax-
able base and, by extension, to a drop in the quality of public services and/or to a
selective process of migration so that public facilities would be under-used [see Nunn
and Ingram (1988) for a case study that confirms these effects].
Academic studies that attempt to test the existence of regional effects provide
contrasting results. Some studies confirm the existence of significant negative effects
on farming communities. For example, Seung et al. (2000) combine a dynamic com-
putable general equilibrium model (CGE) with a recreation demand model to show
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1 Approved by the Ministry of the Environment in June 2004 and available at
http://www.mma.es/secciones/agua/entrada.htm.
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that reallocating the water used for agriculture to recreation in Churchill County
(Nevada) would have negative effects on agricultural output and employment. Mean-
while, Zekri and Easter (2005) apply a linear programming model to Tunisia and
show the negative effects of a water market on employment and farmers’ spending on
inputs and machinery. 
Other studies obtain results that minimize the secondary regional effects. For in-
stance Saliba (1987) demonstrates the low incidence of social problems in river
basins where markets have been operating for some time, like the Colorado River.
Also focusing on this river basin, a study by Howe et al. (1990) about the impact of
the sale of water rights involving agricultural to urban transfers leads to the same con-
clusion. Nunn and Ingram (1988) come to a similar opinion, also highlighting that if
the income that is obtained by those selling water is reinvested in the exporter area, it
is very likely that secondary benefits can be reaped that are at least equal to those that
have been lost. Another additional case is a study by Arriaza et al. (2002), which uses
a multi-criteria programming model to show that while it is true that a water market
in the Guadalquivir basin (Spain) might have positive regional effects, they would not
be very significant. 
At the same time, some studies show that transferring water rights would have
significant positive effects. This is the case of the simulation model developed by
Vaux and Howitt (1984) for California, where a net increase in wealth was forecast
both for the agricultural sector and other sectors. Using a microeconomic production
model, Dinar and Letey (1991) show that, for the same State, transferring some agri-
cultural water rights to the urban sector would generate a rise in agricultural income
and a reduction in the contamination of aquifers. Meanwhile, the results of a simula-
tion model of water transfers in the Maipo river basin in Chile by Rosegrant et al.
(2000) show an increase in the net benefits of the agricultural sector of up to 20%. In
this same country, Hearne and Easter (1995) estimate the economic gains of a market
with intersectorial and intrasectorial transfers between farmers in the Elqui and Li-
marí valleys. 
If water that is used for low-value crops (fodder and grass) is transferred, the ben-
efits of a water market for the agricultural sector can be higher, as demonstrated by
Rosegrant et al. (1995) for the Tamil Nadu basin (India) and by Vergara (1996) for
the Chilean case. Furthermore, water transfers might have a positive effect in agricul-
tural employment as shown by Calatrava and Garrido (2001) using a non-linear math-
ematical programming model to simulate a water market in the Guadalquivir basin
(Spain). In the same line, using a multi-criteria programming model applied to the
Duero Valley (Spain), Martínez and Gómez-Limón (2004) show how water transfers
can reduce the negative effect of droughts on agricultural employment by between
20% and 45%. 
Lastly, other studies detect positive effects, using a general equilibrium analysis.
For instance, Diao and Roe (2000) show how an agricultural water market can have
long-term positive effects on land rents and agricultural wages. In a somewhat differ-
ent context, Diao et al. (2005) show how water transfers lead to an increase in agri-
cultural production and income, despite the drop in agricultural wages. Similarly,
Roe et al. (2005) use a computable general equilibrium model to show that reallocat-
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ing water among farmers leads to significant increases in farmers’ output and bene-
fits. 
Given the water exchanges that might potentially result from the implementation
of the A.G.U.A. programme and the WFD in Spain, and given the diversity of results
that have been obtained on the regional effects of water markets, new applied re-
search must be conducted in order to forecast these effects. The aim of this study is to
provide reasons that account for the differing effects of water markets on farming
communities, aside from differences in the target areas under analysis. More specifi-
cally, we demonstrate the dependency of these effects on the degree of intersectorial
factor mobility2. With this purpose in mind, we use the Computable General Equilib-
rium Model for the Balearic Islands already used in Gómez et al. (2004), and in
Tirado et al. (2006). In Gómez et al. (2004), a variation of this model is used to inves-
tigate the effects of an agricultural-urban water market. In Tirado et al. (2006) the ef-
fects of a water market exclusively among Balearic farmers are simulated. In this last
study, we simulate and compare the effects of a reduction in the water endowment in
a situation in which water is allocated by the authorities and in another scenario in
which water transfers are allowed, but only between agricultural uses. The analysis is
carried out under the assumption of limited factor mobility. The present paper ex-
tends the analysis in Tirado et al. (2006) focusing on the effects of an agricultural wa-
ter market on farming communities facing different draught scenarios. Specifically,
the main contribution of this paper is to compare results under different assumptions
about factor mobility, and in this way to show the relevance of these assumptions
for the results obtained regarding the effects of the water market on farming commu-
nities. 
Thus our analysis considers reductions in water endowments that take place in
two different contexts, one with a low level of factor mobility [as in Tirado et al.
(2006)] and the other with high mobility. In the first context, reductions in water en-
dowments could be equated with droughts originated by below-average precipitation
periods, which, as the next section shows, are very common in the Balearic Islands’
climate. In the second scenario the fall in available water could be interpreted as a re-
duction in water quotas, possibly as a result of the implementation of the new policy
guidelines that stem from the WFD, or as a fall in the natural endowment brought
about by global warming. Our contribution is not only to consider new assumptions
regarding factor mobility, but specially to compare both scenarios. This is why, just
when it is strictly necessary for comparison, some of the results in Tirado et al.
(2006) are reproduced in this paper. 
In general terms, the model shows that an agricultural water market is a
favourable institutional framework for farming communities that face cyclical
droughts. However, in a context of permanent reductions in the water endowment, a
water market reduces agricultural employment, and it would only improve agricul-
tural income in contexts of very severe water shortfalls.
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2 Using a CGE model, Seung et al. (1998) analyze the effects of a water market in the Walker river
basin (USA) under different hypotheses of interstate (not intersectorial) factor mobility.
03 Tirado_01 Blandford  11/01/11  10:46  Página 44
The rest of the study is structured as follows. In next section, the hydrological
characteristics of the area under study are described. In section three, a description is
made of the theoretical model. Section four describes the empirical application and
calibration of the model. In section five we present the simulation results. These as-
sess the implications of an agricultural water market in eleven different scenarios
where there is a reduction in the water endowment for agricultural use. More particu-
larly, we show the effects on water transfers, on the production of different crops and
on agricultural income and employment. Finally, the closing section presents the
main conclusions of the study.
2.  The hydrological situation in the Balearic Islands
Water scarcity in the Balearic Islands is due to a combination of several different
factors that justify a search for efficient water management tools. Underground water
is the main natural source of raw water. Given the archipelago’s topographical and
geological characteristics, there are no permanent rivers or natural sources of surface
water, while reservoirs represent only a small fraction of the total water supply.
Moreover, due to the Mediterranean climate, the availability of water is dependent on
very irregular rainfall and, during dry hydrological years, reserves may fall to half
those of an average year. Seasonal rainfall and the islands’ economic specialization in
sun and sand tourism are two additional important reasons why water is a problem-
atic issue for the Balearic economy, since 65% of the archipelago’s rainfall is concen-
trated over the winter months whereas the demand for water is highest in summer, the
dry season.
The current scarcity could worsen in the future due to the threat of global warm-
ing. Most studies forecast that global warming will have a negative impact on the
availability of water in the Mediterranean as a result of higher temperatures and a
drop in rainfall [see Eisenreich (2005)]. For instance, the Ministry of the Environ-
ment’s forecast for 2030 is a reduction in the Balearic Islands’ average share of fresh
water that ranges from 5% to 12% [see Moreno (2005)]. Higher evapotranspiration
due to warmer weather and lower runoff in Southern Europe [see European Environ-
mental Agency (2006)] will reduce the aquifers capacity for replenishment. For many
over-exploited aquifers in the Balearic Islands, this lower capacity for replenishment
may have a negative effect on the quality of water. This secondary effect would fur-
ther limit the usable water available for human consumption. As global warming is
the result of cumulative effects, its potential repercussions on the availability of water
in the Balearic Islands will span a long period of time, so they can be treated as a per-
manent shock.
3.  A general equilibrium model applied to the Balearic Islands
As in Tirado et al. (2006), the model distinguishes sixteen agricultural sectors (see
Table 1) and seven productive non-agricultural sectors: energy, industry, building,
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tourism, services, production and distribution of drinking water and, finally, a last
sector that covers the primary sector except for agriculture. 
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TABLE 1
Hectares by crops and irrigation technology (sectors) and water consumption by irrigated sectors
Source: Elaborated from data of the Plan Nacional del Regadío, M.A.P.A. (2001) and data provided by the Balearic
Government.
Crops Rainfed Area(Hectares)
Irrigated Area
(Hectares)
Gross Consumption
(Hm3)
Cereals Sector 1
31.934
Sector 2
2.240
7,623
Pulses Sector 3
2.087 
Sector 4
28
0,064
Tubercules – Sector 5
2.930
25,972
Fodder Sector 6
8.302 
Sector 7
4.029
34,69
Green vegetables Sector 8
296
Sector 9
6.308
51,959
Citrics - Sector 10
3.224
23,587
Fruits Sector 11
68.507
Sector 12
2.531
16,867
Industrial crops Sector 13
9
Sector 14
268
1,651
Flowers – Sector 15
211
0,904
Other nonirrigated crops Sector 16
24.579
-
TOTAL 135.714 21.796 163,317
Our assumptions about economic agents, external trade, production factors and
production technologies are the same as in Tirado et al. (2006)3, except for new as-
sumptions regarding factor mobility, that are explained in the following paragraphs.
We consider water supply as use-specific, that is, farmers and water supply and
distribution companies have exclusive rights that allow them to make use of a certain
volume of underground water for a legally specified use, with no exchanged uses be-
ing allowed. However, in the specific case of water for the agricultural use we will
consider two scenarios. First, in the non-market scenario water is specifically allo-
cated to each type of irrigated crop and so it can only be used by the said sector. Sec-
ond, in the market scenario, water is not specifically allocated to certain crops, and
water transfers between different irrigated crop sectors are allowed4. 
3 We refer to this paper and to Gómez et al. (2004) for a detailed explanation of these assumptions. 
4 If we allow water transfers between agricultural and other uses, as it is done in Gómez et al. (2004),
water transfers from agricultural to urban uses would dominate water transfers between agricultural sec-
tors, since it is in the urban use where water has its highest value. 
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It is widely known in the literature on general equilibrium models that results are
largely dependent on the level of factor mobility. It is also common in this type of lit-
erature to associate the level of mobility with the time horizon under analysis and the
permanent or transitory nature of the shocks that are being simulated. Thus a lower
level of mobility is associated with short-term scenarios and an analysis of transitory
shocks, while the assumption that factors like capital or land are intersectorally mo-
bile serves to simulate responses to permanent changes over a longer time horizon.
Bearing this in mind, we developed two variations of the model which differ with
regard to the mobility of land and agricultural capital. Thus in model 1 (M1), both
capital and land are assumed to be crop-specific, fixed factors. However, mobility of
these factors is allowed between irrigated and non-irrigated techniques. This model
coincides with the one employed in Tirado et al. (2006) and allows for the simulation
of a short-term analysis, where, when there is a temporary drought, the farmer must
decide whether to continue using all the available water or whether to sell all or part
of his allowance, in which case she can choose to grow non-irrigated crops. However,
the farmer does not have enough time to change his production plans from one crop
to another, since in many cases they are decided before knowing the climatic condi-
tions for that year, or to reallocate specific factors (land and capital), and she can only
alter production by changing the single variable factor, labour. With model 2 (M2), in
contrast, land and capital are fully mobile, both between crops and between irrigated
and non-irrigated techniques. This assumption is more appropriate to explore the ef-
fects of permanent reductions in the water endowment for agricultural use, whether
due to climatic reasons or institutional restrictions.
4.  Empirical application and calibration
As it is explained in Tirado et al. (2006), the model is developed using informa-
tion from the input-output tables for the Balearic Islands. The final output value of
each crop is calculated using data from the National Agricultural Accounting Net-
work for 1997 (MAPA, 1999) and from data supplied by the Government of the
Balearic Islands’ Department of Agriculture for the same year. 
It is assumed that the sum of the items “Wages and Earnings” and “Social Secu-
rity Contributions” in the input-output tables constitute labour income. The value of
income from land is calculated using data supplied by the Balearic Department of
Agriculture and the yearly survey on land prices for 1997. Investment income is cal-
culated as the difference between the gross value added at factor cost and income
from labour and land. For the purposes of simplification, we consider consumption
by non-residents to be exports. It is also assumed that public or joint consumption
forms part of the consumption of the representative agent. 
The data for the different water endowments is mainly taken from the Balearic
Hydrological Plan (Govern de les Illes Balears, 1999). The water endowment for ur-
ban use amounts to 109 hm3. This includes the amount of underground water and wa-
ter reservoirs used by the water supply sector, plus the water used by the industry not
connected to the public water network and golf fields’ irrigation. Table 1 shows gross
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water consumption per crop in 1997. This is calculated using data on the surface area
of crops supplied by the Balearic Department of Agriculture and Fisheries and infor-
mation on net consumption per crop from the National Irrigation Plan (MAPA,
2001). We further assume a return flow of 22%. As can be seen, the total water en-
dowment for agricultural use amounts to 163, 317 hm3.
The model is calibrated using the Mathematical Programming System for General
Equilibrium (MPSGE), a subsystem of the General Algebraic Modelling System
(GAMS, 2001). The elasticities of substitution and transformation are those already
used in Tirado et al. (2006).
The price of labour is set as the numeraire. As to the rest of prices, we follow the
traditional Harberger Convention and set prices equal to one for the reference sce-
nario to transform monetary values in the I-O table into physical units5. Nevertheless,
we do not apply this normalization to the following cases.
First, the existence of indirect taxes on production implies a difference between
the buyer and the seller prices. We opt to normalize the buyer’s price to one and,
therefore, the producer’s price is different to one.
Second, in the production of drinking water the amount of output (drinking water)
must be equal to the amount of input (raw water). This makes necessary to calibrate
the drinking water price in order to obtain a unitary Leontief. 
Third, the absence of an existing water market for agricultural use in the reference
scenario means that a reference price equal to zero is set. This is due to the fact that
the farmer is endowed with a right to make use of a certain volume of underground
water. Once the farmer has this right, she does not have to pay any price for the drawn
water except for the extraction costs. 
The database refers to a year, 1997, when no water transfers were allowed and
where the available water was allocated for each use/user by the authorities. As ex-
plained in Tirado (2003), year 1997 can be considered a year with normal rainfall,
with available resources of about 95%. This dataset is used to calibrate the model,
which implies the assumption that the situation in 1997 was an equilibrium of the
model. This is why, in the baseline scenario (SB in the tables), the water market has
no effect on the considered variables and changes in the water endowment are needed
for the water market to have any noticeable effect. 
5.  Analysis of the results
In both water market and non-market scenarios we simulate eleven different
drought scenarios in which there is a reduction in the available water, with a sequen-
tial 5% reduction in each case. These simulations are implemented in M1 and M2,
that is, under the assumptions of temporary or permanent droughts, respectively. We
therefore obtain four results for each drought scenario (no-market and temporary
draught; market and temporary draught; no-market and permanent drought; market
and permanent draught). In total, we implement forty-four simulations. 
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5 Of course, prices are allowed to change in the different departures from the reference scenario.
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In the analysis of results, we first consider the direction and volume of water
transfers resulting from the water market. As explained before, water allocation in
the SB is by assumption an equilibrium and, therefore, in the SB there are no water
transactions. However, when allowed, water transactions take place in drought sce-
narios since the fall in water endowments increases water scarcity and the shadow
price of water. However, this does not happen evenly among water uses. Therefore,
farmers make profits from the Pareto improvements result from water transactions
between different crops. As for the total volume that is transferred (see Table 2), it
should be noted that a greater mobility of land and agricultural capital generates an
increase in the total amount that is exchanged for each level of available water.
Thus, if we allow land and capital, which are crop specific in M1, to become totally
mobile, as in M2, water transfers rise between 61% and 74%, depending on the
severity of the water restrictions. This higher volume of transactions is attributable
to the fact that in M2 farmers have more potential for switching their production
plans from one crop to another and reallocating factors in response to the drop in
available water. Another way to put it is that, when there are specific factors, mar-
ginal product of water respond quickly to changes in the amount of water used.
This response is slower with mobile factors, as it is possible to change quantities of
more inputs jointly with changes in the water used. This greater flexibility would
also explain the lower market price of water in M2: In Figure 1, we can see how,
whereas water price increases in both models as water becomes less available, this
increase is lower in M2.
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FIGURE 1
Market price of agricultural water for different short and long run droughts
Source: Own calculations.
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SB Water Supply (% of a normal hydrological year)
95% 90% 85% 80% 75% 70% 65% 60% 55% 50% 45% 40%
Cereals
Water Endowments 7,62 7,24 6,86 6,48 6,10 5,72 5,34 4,95 4,57 4,19 3,81 3,43
Water Transfers M1 0,00 –0,25 –0,50 –0,75 –0,98 –1,20 –1,41 –1,60 –1,76 –1,88 –1,95 –1,97
Water Transfers M2 0,00 –0,11 –0,23 –0,35 –0,48 –0,61 –0,74 –0,86 –0,98 –1,09 –1,18 –1,24
% Variation Water 
Transfers 0,00 1,96 3,99 6,07 8,21 10,39 12,61 14,83 16,96 18,88 20,41 21,38
Fodder
Water Endowments 34,69 32,96 31,22 29,49 27,75 26,02 24,28 22,55 20,81 19,08 17,35 15,61
Water Transfers M1 0,00 –0,83 –1,63 –2,41 –3,16 –3,88 –4,58 –5,24 –5,85 –6,40 –6,87 –7,20
Water Transfers M2 0,00 –0,28 –0,59 –0,93 –1,29 –1,69 –2,11 –2,56 –3,02 –3,50 –3,98 –4,43
% Variation Water 
Transfers 0,00 1,66 3,33 5,03 6,73 8,44 10,16 11,89 13,60 15,22 16,64 17,70
Industrial crops
Water Endowments 1,65 1,57 1,49 1,40 1,32 1,24 1,16 1,07 0,99 0,91 0,83 0,74
Water Transfers M1 0,00 –0,03 –0,07 –0,10 –0,13 –0,16 –0,18 –0,21 –0,24 –0,26 –0,29 –0,32
Water Transfers M2 0,00 –0,02 –0,03 –0,05 –0,07 –0,09 –0,12 –0,14 –0,17 –0,19 –0,22 –0,25
% Variation Water 
Transfers 0,00 1,19 2,33 3,40 4,37 5,23 5,97 6,58 7,09 7,54 8,08 9,01
Pulses
Water Endowments 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03
Water Transfers M1 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 –0,01 –0,01 –0,01 –0,01 –0,01 –0,01 –0,01 –0,01
Water Transfers M2 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
% Variation Water 
Transfers 0,00 2,82 5,84 9,08 12,57 16,37 20,50 25,03 29,97 35,33 41,06 47,13
Tubercules
Water Endowments 25,97 24,67 23,37 22,08 20,78 19,48 18,18 16,88 15,58 14,28 12,99 11,69
Water Transfers M1 0,00 –0,48 –0,93 –1,36 –1,75 –2,12 –2,46 –2,77 –3,06 –3,33 –3,60 –3,88
Water Transfers M2 0,00 –2,48 –4,72 –6,69 –8,34 –9,66 –10,61 –11,21 –11,47 –11,40 –11,04 –10,42
% Variation Water 
Transfers 0,00 –8,09 –16,20 –24,15 –31,72 –38,69 –44,86 –50,01 –53,96 –56,48 –57,29 –55,92
Fruits
Water Endowments 16,87 16,02 15,18 14,34 13,49 12,65 11,81 10,96 10,12 9,28 8,43 7,59
Water Transfers M1 0,00 0,00 –0,01 –0,04 –0,09 –0,16 –0,26 –0,39 –0,54 –0,71 –0,90 –1,08
Water Transfers M2 0,00 0,53 1,08 1,63 2,20 2,78 3,39 4,02 4,67 5,33 5,99 6,62
% Variation Water 
Transfers 0,00 3,31 7,15 11,64 16,95 23,30 30,94 40,22 51,49 65,17 81,67 101,45
Green vegetables
Water Endowments 51,96 49,36 46,76 44,17 41,57 38,97 36,37 33,77 31,18 28,58 25,98 23,38
Water Transfers M1 0,00 1,44 2,86 4,24 5,58 6,89 8,16 9,38 10,55 11,67 12,71 13,66
Water Transfers M2 0,00 2,08 4,15 6,18 8,17 10,09 11,92 13,60 15,04 16,14 16,73 16,66
% Variation Water 
Transfers 0,00 1,30 2,76 4,39 6,22 8,22 10,34 12,49 14,41 15,66 15,48 12,81
TABLE 2
Water endowment by crops (hm3), water transfers by crops (hm3), difference
in water transfers between M2 and M1 (relative to initial endowment by crops,
in percentage terms) and total water transfers (hm3) under different factor 
mobility scenarios
(cont.)
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Table 2 reveals that, regardless of the level of factor mobility, most transfers are
made for the cultivation of green vegetables, the crop with the highest shadow price.
This result is coherent with those obtained in other studies in Spain and elsewhere
[for instance, Vergara (1996), Rosegrant et al. (1995), Calatrava and Garrido (2001),
Arriaza et al. (2002) and Diao et al. (2005)]. Flowers constitute another crop for
which water would be bought in the market, irrespective of the degree of factor mo-
bility. On the other side, farmers growing cereals, fodder, industrial crops and tuber-
cules would become water sellers irrespective of the considered scenario. 
However, the different assumptions regarding factor mobility also make some dif-
ference in the pattern of water transactions6. Thus greater mobility is beneficial for
fruit crops (from which water would be sold in M1 but purchased it in M2) to the
detriment of citrus plants (for which water would be purchased in all scenarios in M1,
but sold in large amounts in M2). As for water sellers as growers of grain, fodder, in-
dustrial crops and tubercles, while different assumptions about factor mobility do not
modify the sign of the transaction, they do have a significant impact on the volume.
In fact, higher factor mobility implies lower amounts of water sold by the first three,
whereas growers of tubercules sell more water and become the main seller in ab-
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SB Water Supply (% of a normal hydrological year)
95% 90% 85% 80% 75% 70% 65% 60% 55% 50% 45% 40%
Flowers
Water Endowments 0,90 0,86 0,81 0,77 0,72 0,68 0,63 0,59 0,54 0,50 0,45 0,41
Water Transfers M1 0,00 0,02 0,05 0,07 0,09 0,11 0,12 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,11 0,05
Water Transfers M2 0,00 0,03 0,05 0,08 0,10 0,12 0,13 0,14 0,15 0,14 0,13 0,10
% Variation Water 
Transfers 0,00 0,55 1,07 1,52 1,85 2,00 1,91 1,54 0,96 0,66 2,57 11,83
Citrics
Water Endowments 23,59 22,41 21,23 20,05 18,87 17,69 16,51 15,33 14,15 12,97 11,79 10,61
Water Transfers M1 0,00 0,12 0,24 0,35 0,45 0,54 0,63 0,70 0,76 0,79 0,79 0,74
Water Transfers M2 0,00 0,24 0,29 0,13 –0,28 –0,95 –1,86 –2,99 –4,23 –5,44 –6,43 –7,05
% Variation Water 
Transfers 0,00 0,51 0,25 –1,09 –3,85 –8,41 –15,08 –24,07 –35,24 –48,03 –61,27 –73,35
Total Water Transfers 
M1 0,00 1,59 3,14 4,65 6,12 7,54 8,90 10,21 11,45 12,59 13,62 14,46
Total Water Transfers 
M2 0,00 2,65 5,28 7,89 10,46 12,99 15,44 17,76 19,86 21,61 22,85 23,39
Source: Own calculations.
TABLE 2 (cont.)
6 Differences in water transactions between M1 and M2 are displayed in line “%variation water
transfers” of Table 2, which measures, for each crop, the difference between water transactions in M2 mi-
nus water transactions in M1 over the water endowment resulting from the corresponding draught condi-
tions.
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solute terms. Finally, growers of green vegetables and flowers buy water in both sce-
narios, but higher factor mobility tends to increase their water purchases.
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TABLE 3
Changes of agricultural sectorial output resulting from a water market creation
in different short run draughts (in percentage terms)
Source: Own calculations.
M1
Water Supply (% of a normal hydrological year)
SB
95% 90% 85% 80% 75% 70% 65% 60% 55% 50% 45% 40%
Irrigated
agriculture
Cereals 05 –0,98 –2,27 –3,95 –6,12 –8,89 –12,37 –16,66 –21,82 –27,84 –34,56 –41,68
Industrial
crops 0 –0,28 –0,67 –1,21 –1,96 –3,00 –4,45 –6,49 –9,37 –13,48 –19,37 –27,73
Fodder 0 –0,54 –1,27 –2,26 –3,58 –5,36 –7,71 –10,81 –14,84 –19,98 –26,33 –33,81
Pulses 0 –0,43 –1,01 –1,77 –2,77 –4,07 –5,73 –7,85 –10,48 –13,67 –17,42 –21,60
Fruits 0 0,00 –0,01 –0,07 –0,19 –0,41 –0,82 –1,49 –2,55 –4,15 –6,42 –9,40
Green 
vegetables 0 0,08 0,24 0,53 1,06 2,04 3,77 6,68 11,27 17,89 26,71 37,84
Tubercules 0 –0,11 –0,26 –0,46 –0,75 –1,15 –1,70 –2,49 –3,63 –5,28 –7,77 –11,64
Citrics 0 0,02 0,04 0,08 0,14 0,23 0,36 0,54 0,81 1,18 1,67 2,22
Flowers 0 0,24 0,67 1,40 2,57 4,35 6,84 10,00 13,56 16,77 17,47 10,27
Rainfed
agriculture
Cereals 0 –0,01 –0,04 –0,10 –0,19 –0,34 –0,57 –0,94 –1,49 –2,30 –3,42 –4,90
Industrial
crops 0 0,18 0,42 0,74 1,17 1,74 2,50 3,48 4,72 6,21 7,76 8,66
Fodder 0 0,22 0,51 0,89 1,40 2,06 2,91 4,00 5,35 6,95 8,73 10,43
Pulses 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 –0,01 –0,01 –0,02 –0,04 –0,06 –0,09 –0,13
Fruits 0 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,05 0,09 0,15 0,25 0,37 0,53 0,69
Green 
vegetables 0 –0,08 –0,24 –0,51 –0,97 –1,71 –2,71 –3,68 –3,88 –2,26 1,97 9,18
Others 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 –0,01 –0,01 –0,02 –0,03 –0,04 –0,05
A second analysis refers to the effects of the water market creation on sectorial
agricultural output, which is shown in Tables 3 and 4. When comparing Tables 3 and
4 with Table 2, we can see that the effects of the market on irrigated agricultural out-
put have a high correlation with water transfers. Thus, as a general rule, when farmers
growing one crop sell (buy) water, their output fall (increase). Furthermore, when
changes in factor mobility induce a change in the pattern of water transfers, it also
has a similar effect on the consequences of the water market on irrigated agricultural
output. To put two examples, higher factor mobility not only implies higher water
sales by growers of tubercules, but also tends to exacerbate the negative effect of the
market on tubercules production; it also implies larger water purchases for irrigated
03 Tirado_01 Blandford  11/01/11  10:46  Página 52
green vegetables which in turn boosts the market-induced increase in their output.
Another interesting case is the fruit sector. This sector is classified by the literature
among those where water use reaches its highest value. Despite this, in M1 the mar-
ket induces fruits to sell water and reduce production. This can be explained by the
difficulty of woody crops to adapt their production plans to short run shocks. This is
confirmed by the different behaviour in M2: when factor mobility is high enough, the
response of fruit producers to the water market is to buy water and increase the
output.
By definition, rainfed agriculture does not make use of water and, therefore, water
transfers have no direct effect on these crops. Nevertheless, as shown in Tables 3 and
4, the creation of a water market modifies rainfed production through an effect on in-
tersectorial transfers of other production factors different from water. Moreover, the
comparison on Tables 3 and 4 reveal that the effects are different depending on
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M2
Water Supply (% of a normal hydrological year)
SB
95% 90% 85% 80% 75% 70% 65% 60% 55% 50% 45% 40%
Irrigated
agriculture
Cereals 0 –0,72 –1,72 –3,07 –4,81 –6,98 –9,62 –12,72 –16,32 –20,41 –24,99 –30,00
Industrial
crops 0 –0,52 –1,26 –2,28 –3,64 –5,39 –7,62 –10,38 –13,79 –18,01 –23,20 –29,53
Fodder 0 –0,45 –1,13 –2,09 –3,38 –5,06 –7,16 –9,72 –12,82 –16,55 –21,03 –26,33
Pulses 0 –0,07 –0,28 –0,63 –1,12 –1,72 –2,35 –2,91 –3,24 –3,21 –2,69 –1,51
Fruits 0 0,37 0,80 1,45 2,59 4,50 7,52 11,98 18,23 26,62 37,55 51,54
Green 
vegetables 0 1,46 3,48 6,15 9,56 13,78 18,86 24,82 31,61 39,01 46,63 53,76
Tubercules 0 –6,62 –13,87 –21,61 –29,67 –37,82 –45,86 –53,61 –60,93 –67,72 –73,89 –79,32
Citrics 0 0,16 –0,31 –1,56 –3,75 –7,06 –11,66 –17,76 –25,44 –34,63 –44,90 –55,45
Flowers 0 1,22 2,73 4,53 6,61 8,94 11,45 14,02 16,45 18,37 19,26 18,41
Rainfed
agriculture
Cereals 0 –0,35 –0,92 –1,77 –2,95 –4,49 –6,42 –8,73 –11,41 –14,44 –17,79 –21,39
Industrial
crops 0 –0,28 –0,72 –1,38 –2,29 –3,53 –5,15 –7,21 –9,80 –13,05 –17,12 –22,19
Fodder 0 –0,20 –0,57 –1,17 –2,06 –3,27 –4,85 –6,82 –9,22 –12,09 –15,49 –19,51
Pulses 0 –0,13 –0,44 –1,01 –1,86 –3,04 –4,53 –6,31 –8,31 –10,45 –12,64 –14,78
Fruits 0 –0,24 –0,80 –1,66 –2,77 –4,00 –5,22 –6,28 –7,02 –7,26 –6,82 –5,49
Green 
vegetables 0 1,39 3,26 5,70 8,76 12,50 16,94 22,06 27,79 33,91 40,01 45,48
Others 0 0,02 –0,11 –0,40 –0,92 –1,66 –2,65 –3,84 –5,20 –6,67 –8,18 –9,67
TABLE 4
Changes of agricultural sectorial output resulting from a water market creation
in different long run draughts (in percentage terms)
Source: Own calculations.
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whether the economy is hit by either short or long run droughts. Thus, in the first case
(Table 3), the water market has a mild effect on rainfed production. Moreover, there
is not a dominant direction of change, with some crops increasing their production
and some others reducing it. However, in the context of a long run drought (Table 4),
production of rainfed crops is strongly affected by the water market creation, which
causes an almost generalized fall in production. The only exception is green vegeta-
bles, which turn out to be one of the rainfed crops with higher added value [Calatrava
and Garrido (2001), Martínez and Gómez-Limón (2004)].
A corollary of the analysis in the two preceding paragraphs is that the capacity of
the water market to stimulate the reallocation of resources to those crops with highest
added value very much depends on the considered time horizon or, put in a different
way, on the mobility of other production factors. Thus, as explained before, in our
long run scenarios, the water market clearly favours crops like fruits and green veg-
etables over the rest of crops, something that happens to much lesser extent in the
short run scenario.
Third, as to the welfare effects of the water market, the Hicksian equivalent varia-
tion of the representative agent indicates that the water market improves the welfare
of the representative Balearic agent in all scenarios, something that should be attrib-
utable to the positive effect on resource allocation efficiency. This indicator shows an
improvement in aggregate Balearic welfare, but our primary focus is on the regional
effects on agricultural areas. Since we do not have sufficient data to identify a repre-
sentative agent for farming communities, the market effects on these communities are
proxied by the behaviour of the agricultural gross value added (GVA) and employ-
ment. Although this is an indirect way of measuring the impact on welfare, it is also
the common procedure used in literature.
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TABLE 5
Changes of rural labour, agriculture’s GVA and water rents from a water 
market creation in different short and long run draughts (in percentage terms)*
Source: Own calculations.
* This data compares, for each drought scenario, the percentage change resulting from the water market creation. For
instance, result in the upper-right cell is: (rural labor with market40%-rural labor without market40%)/rural labor without
market40%, where the subindex refers to the drought severity.
Water Supply (% of a normal hydrological year)
SB
95% 90% 85% 80% 75% 70% 65% 60% 55% 50% 45% 40%
Rural Labour
M1 0 0,00 0,01 0,04 0,13 0,32 0,67 1,29 2,25 3,51 4,97 6,43
M2 0 –0,25 –0,58 –0,96 –1,39 –1,84 –2,29 –2,67 –2,93 –2,99 –2,75 –2,09
GVA agriculture
without water rents
M1 0 0,28 0,84 1,93 3,95 7,59 13,74 23,10 34,94 46,28 53,47 54,74
M2 0 0,16 0,48 1,00 1,77 2,82 4,20 5,91 7,95 10,29 12,88 15,65
Water Rents 
M1 0 –28,78 –35,36 –42,45 –49,55 –55,97 –60,88 –63,49 –63,16 –59,45 –52,15 –41,34
M2 0 –42,53 –46,25 –49,40 –51,88 –53,66 –54,69 –54,93 –54,33 –52,79 –50,24 –46,64
GVA agriculture
with water rents
M1 0 0,02 0,06 0,14 0,30 0,61 1,15 2,05 3,42 5,27 7,48 9,84
M2 0 –0,18 –0,36 –0,54 –0,70 –0,82 –0,86 –0,80 –0,60 –0,19 0,50 1,53
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In Table 5, changes in employment resulting from the water market creation are
presented for models M1 and M2. In a short run scenario (M1), the market lessens
the negative effect of droughts on jobs. On the contrary, in the context of long run wa-
ter restrictions (M2), the water market exacerbates job losses in the agricultural sec-
tor. This latter result can be explained through a more detailed analysis by crops that
reveals factor substitution in the fruit production. Thus, in the long run scenario,
those crops that expand (contract) their production to a higher extent are also those
that create (destroy) more jobs, with the outstanding exception of fruits. In the case of
fruits, the water market both expands production and reduces this crop’s employ-
ment, except when the market is created in a context of very severe water shortage,
when the water-market-induced increase in fruit production is accompanied by a
small increase in this crop’s employment. But even in this latter case, the employ-
ment increase is much smaller, in percentage terms, than the increase in production
and water used, revealing an intense factor substitution7. It may be the case that capi-
tal mobility in M2 allows fruit production to change to more efficient irrigation and
production techniques that may be labour-saving.
Table 5 also presents the effect of the water market in two measures of agricultural
GVA, one that excludes and other that includes water rents. Water rent of a crop is
equal to the marginal value of water in this crop production times the amount of wa-
ter used. This marginal value of water is a shadow price when there is no market
whereas is equal to the market price when transactions are allowed. First, when water
rents are not included, that is, when we consider the sum of capital, land and labour
income8, data reveals that in both short and long run scenarios the water market miti-
gates the fall in GVA associated with water shortages. Nevertheless, this happens to a
lesser extend in the long run one, an effect that may be associated to the fall in em-
ployment in this scenario. Second, water rents are diminished by the water market in
all scenarios, due to the fall in water price when the market is created which is more
pronounced in the long run one (see figure 1). Finally, when total GVA is analyzed,
the water market brings about a positive effect in total GVA when the economy faces
short run droughts. However, in most of the long run droughts scenarios the fall in
water rents associated to the water market dominates over the increase in other agri-
cultural income sources, giving place to a negative effect on total GVA. Only in con-
texts of very severe water shortfalls a water market would improve total agricultural
income, although to a much lesser extent than in the case of short run droughts of the
same magnitude.
Thus it seems that as it becomes easier for farmers to reallocate specific factors
between different crops, a water market intensifies the negative effects on agricul-
tural income and employment due to reductions in the available water endowment.
These results show how the regional effects of a water market are not just depen-
dent on the characteristics of the geographical area under study, but also on the
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7 Data on employment changes in the fruit production is not presented in the paper, but is available
on request.
8 Capital, land and labour income are the respective market price times the amount of each factor
used in production.
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nature of the shocks that affect the availability of water and the adaptation time to
these shocks. 
6.  Conclusions
The appeal of water markets, based on potential improvements in water allocation
efficiency, should be weighed up against their possible redistributive effects, which
might be detrimental to certain sectors of society. The literature has focused on the
possible negative effects that water markets might have on communities and regions
that are dependent on agriculture. However, the literature offers ambiguous conclu-
sions about the impacts in the farm sector.
In order to assess the effects of water markets on the agricultural sector of the
Balearic Islands, using a computable general equilibrium model, we have simulated
the role of an agricultural water market in different scenarios where there is a reduc-
tion in the water endowment brought about by cyclical or permanent water shortages.
Besides the usefulness of this analysis in contributing to better water management in
the Balearic Islands, the results show, in consonance with literature, that no simple
generalizations can be made about the effects of a water market on agricultural com-
munities. Specifically, our study shows how sensitive those effects are on assump-
tions about factor mobility and, therefore, hints that the differences in modelling as-
sumptions can be an important source of lack of consensus in the literature.
Thus, in our simulations, low factor mobility is assumed for scenarios of short-run
droughts, whereas higher factor mobility is considered when representing the effects
of permanent water shortfalls. We show that the potential positive effects that a mar-
ket might have on the agricultural GVA and employment would be attributable to the
existence of limits in the reallocation of factors, which is characteristic of a short
term scenario. When there is sufficient factor mobility within the agricultural sector
(that is, in a long-term scenario), a water market would lead to a fall in agricultural
employment and, in most of the scenarios that were simulated, to a reduction in the
agricultural GVA. Nevertheless, this latter result is determined by the reduction that
the water market has on water rents which, in most of the long run scenarios, tends to
compensate the increase in the rest of agricultural income triggered by the water 
market. 
In the context of the Balearic Islands, these results can be interpreted in connec-
tion with specific climatic phenomena. According to this interpretation, an agricul-
tural water market would help to mitigate the negative effects of cyclical (short term)
droughts on farming communities, while it could worsen the negative effect of per-
manent reductions in the availability of water caused by global warming or by more
restrictive policies as those resulting from the implementation of the European Water
Framework Directive.
Nevertheless, certain limitations in the data and the methodology may affect the
validity of our results. First, disaggregation of the Balearic agricultural sector in
terms of agricultural areas, size of farms or crop composition is limited by the un-
availability of good quality data at these levels of decomposition. Second, we model
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an ideal case of water market without transaction costs. To the extent that these trans-
action costs exist, water transfers triggered by the market will be lower than our sim-
ulations predict. Finally, the CES production functions imposed by the use of a CGE
model may not be able to reflect adequately a common practice in a context of water
scarcity, viz. regulated deficit irrigation.
7.  List of Acronyms
CGE: Computable General Equilibrium.
GVA: Gross Value Added.
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
WFD: Water Framework Directive.
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